



Buying Globalization: Consumer Orientation and Perceptions about Trade

EDDIE HEARN 

Doshisha University

Individual attitudes toward trade are typically analyzed through trade's consequences on labor markets. Few studies directly consider the impact of trade on consumers, who are commonly assumed to benefit from liberalization. Trade protection, however, provides welfare gains for heavy consumers of domestic goods by ensuring the availability of domestically produced products and by dispersing the cost of maintaining inefficient sectors across all members of the economy. Variations in consumer preferences thus impact the perceived personal pocketbook effects of trade. By integrating theory from political economy and consumer psychology, this article provides a framework for understanding consumer interests toward trade liberalization. An analysis of U.S. public opinion lends support to the importance of consumer orientation in individual perceptions of trade. Future work examining the role of self-interest in trade attitude formation should carefully consider consumer tastes as well as labor markets and sociotropic concerns.

Keywords: Political Economy, International Trade, Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Consumer Psychology, Consumption, Globalization, Free Trade, Protectionism.

Related Articles:

Anderson, Bret, Brian S. Krueger, and Ping Xu. 2016. "Does Global Market Integration Weaken Opinion-Policy Congruence in the American States?" *Politics & Policy* 44 (4): 677-711. <https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12167>

Gruber, Lloyd. 2013. "Trade, Growth, Poverty, and Politics: Toward a Unified Theory." *Politics & Policy* 41 (5): 723-764. <https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12034>

Acknowledgements: A previous version of this research was presented at the 2017 Korean Political Science Association World Congress at Yonsei University. I would like to thank Mi Hwa Hong, Don Moon, Nam Kyu Kim, and Ammar Shamaileh as well as the anonymous referees and editors at *Politics & Policy* for comments and suggestions that helped to greatly improve the quality of the project. I would also like to thank Sean Ehrlich, Dale Smith, and Brad Gomez for feedback and support on a previous version of this study.

Jackson, Sarita. 2012. "Building Transnational Networks: Civil Society and the Politics of Trade in the Americas—By Marisa von Bülow." *Politics & Policy* 40 (3): 539-541. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2012.00362.x>

Related Media:

US Consumer Product Safety Commission: <https://www.cpsc.gov/>

Fair Trade USA: <https://www.fairtradecertified.org/>

Comprando globalización: orientación al consumidor y percepciones sobre el comercio

Las actitudes individuales hacia el comercio generalmente se analizan a través de las consecuencias del comercio en los mercados laborales. Pocos estudios consideran directamente el impacto del comercio en los consumidores, que comúnmente se supone que se benefician de la liberalización. Sin embargo, la protección del comercio proporciona beneficios de bienestar para los grandes consumidores de bienes nacionales al garantizar la disponibilidad de productos de producción nacional y al dispersar el costo de mantener sectores ineficientes en todos los actores de la economía. Por lo tanto, las variaciones en las preferencias de los consumidores impactan los efectos personales autointerés percibidos en las transacciones comerciales. Al integrar la teoría de la economía política con la psicología del consumidor, este artículo proporciona un marco para comprender los intereses del consumidor hacia la liberalización del comercio. Un análisis de la opinión pública de los Estados Unidos respalda la importancia de la orientación al consumidor en las percepciones individuales del comercio. El trabajo futuro que examino sobre el papel del interés propio en la formación de actitudes comerciales debería considerar cuidadosamente los gustos de los consumidores, así como los mercados laborales y las preocupaciones sociotrópicas.

Palabras Clave: Economía política, Comercio internacional, Política exterior, Opinión pública, Psicología del consumidor, Consume, Globalización, Libre comercio, Proteccionismo.

购买全球化：消费者对贸易的取向和感知

般通过贸易对劳动力市场产生的结果来分析个人对贸易的态度。就通常被认为在贸易自由化中受益的消费者而言，很少有研究直接考量贸易对其造成的影响。然而，贸易保护通过确保国内生产的产品可获得性并通过将维持低效部门的成本分散给经济中的所有成员，从而为大量购买国内商品的消费者提供福利。消费者偏好的差异因此会影响被感知的、贸易对个人财力产生的效果。通过结合政治经济学理论和消费者心理学理论，本文提出一项框架，用于理解贸易自由化下的消费者利益。一项关于美国舆论的分析，支持消费者取向在个人对贸易的感知中的重要性。就检验个人利益在形成贸易态度上发挥的作用，未来研究应仔细考量消费者品味、劳动力市场和与社会依赖相关的顾虑。

关键词: 政治经济, 国际贸易, 外交政策, 舆论, 消费者心理, 消费, 全球化, 自由贸易, 保护主义.

While the consumer benefits of trade are often highlighted to promote market liberalization, the public's perception of trade's effect on consumption is divided. Typical studies of trade attitudes, however, do not directly consider the role of consumer preferences.¹ This article argues that trade has distributional effects on society as a result of differences in consumer orientation.² Trade protection harms globally oriented consumers but provides welfare gains for domestically oriented consumers by ensuring the availability of domestically produced import-competing products and by dispersing the cost of maintaining inefficient sectors across all members of the economy.

Empirical analysis of U.S. public opinion lends support to the consumer orientation theory. Consumers with a tendency to prefer domestic goods are more likely to view trade negatively. Consumers with a global orientation, on the contrary, are found to perceive trade as beneficial. In contrast to the traditional economic view of consumer interests, not all consumers are buying into globalization. While some consumers view trade protection as a tax raising the cost of imports, others see protectionism as a means for maintaining preferred goods.

Furthermore, consumer interests provide a stronger link between trade perceptions and self-interest than labor market anxiety. Education level is found to have no effect on negative perceptions of trade. On the contrary, and in line with the learning hypothesis, high skill is strongly associated with positive perceptions of trade. Future research considering the role of self-interest in trade policy preferences should therefore incorporate a wider view of interest formation beyond anticipated labor market risks. While it is necessary to remain cautious when considering the effect of attitudes on perceptions, it is important to move beyond simple economic variables when thinking about consumer preferences and self-interest.

Consumer Interests and Trade Attitudes

Trade liberalization is commonly theorized as a collective action problem in which special interest groups prevent consumers from benefiting from the lower prices and increased variety produced by open trade. As a result, the overwhelming majority of trade opinion research has attempted to examine the impact of labor market anxiety on trade attitudes, while consumer interests are held constant. Baker (2005, 925) describes this tendency “to overlook varying demand and consumption

¹ A few notable exceptions to this trend are Baker (2003, 2005), Ehrlich (2010a), and Naoi and Kume (2011, 2015).

² The phrase “consumer orientation” is used to differentiate from the constructs of consumer ethnocentrism and consumer nationalism as well as the concept of consumer tastes presented by Baker (2005).

patterns as a possible source of trade policy preferences” as the largest failure of the literature on mass opinions toward trade.

The relative lack of emphasis on consumer interests can generally be attributed to two assumptions commonly found in the literature. First, in classical trade models, goods are assumed to be homogenous across countries.³ Consumers, therefore, cannot differentiate products based on their country of origin. Second, researchers have adopted a narrow view of consumer preferences that ignores the complexity of consumer behavior. As a result, all consumers are assumed to benefit from the lower domestic prices and increased variety created by open trade. This expectation, however, overlooks the fact that many consumers express strong preferences for domestically produced goods.

Although a number of studies make implicit and explicit assumptions about consumer interests, few directly consider the preferences of consumers. Hall, Kao, and Nelson (1998), for example, argue that women are less supportive of tariffs as a result of playing a larger role in household consumption activities but the authors do not directly analyze the consumption preferences of women. Furthermore, studies directly examining consumer interests have produced mixed results. Hiscox (2006), for example, tests the influence of framing on trade opinion formation but finds that information about the welfare gains of trade for consumers does not alter opinions. Naoi and Kume (2015), on the contrary and using an experimental approach, show that consumer interests increase support for trade. While Naoi and Kume (2011), identify no effect for consumer priming on support for agricultural trade. Traditional approaches to consumer preferences provide little explanation for these discrepancies.

Baker (2003, 2005) significantly advances the literature on trade attitudes by considering variation in consumption patterns. Baker argues that trade will lead to price increases for exported products and price decreases for imported products. Consumers who largely purchase exportable goods from their country will face higher prices and welfare loss relative to those who mainly purchase import and import-competing products. Baker (2003, 2005) thus predicts that the propensity to consume skill-intensive goods should be negatively related to support for free trade in countries where skill is relatively abundant. In countries where skill is relatively scarce, on the contrary, the propensity to consume skill-intensive goods should be positively related to support for trade liberalization. Wealthy individuals are considered to have consumption baskets containing more skill-intensive goods. Baker (2003) relies on this assumption to explain high levels of support for trade in Latin America where skill is scarce finding that high-income earners, consumers of skill-intensive goods, are more likely to hold protrade attitudes.

³ New Trade Theory and New New Trade Theory allow for heterogeneous goods but similarly highlight the consumer benefits of trade. Trade liberalization is predicted to lead to lower consumer prices due to increasing returns to scale and the survival of only the most efficient firms. Furthermore, as a result of product differentiation trade liberalization is associated with an increase in the variety of goods available to consumers. See Helpman (1981) and Krugman (1981).

This approach, however, is less convincing when applied to consumer baskets in developed economies. In the case of a developing economy with a relative shortage of skilled labor, for instance, low-skill workers will pay higher prices for labor-intensive products that will be exported as a result of trade. Because many of these products are human necessities such as food and clothing, it is reasonable to assume that poor consumers cannot substitute away from these goods. However, in an advanced-industrialized economy, poor consumers will benefit from cheap imports, while consumers of skill-intensive goods will face higher prices for exported products. It is likely, however, that consumers of skill-intensive products will substitute away from exportable goods to imports making trade beneficial for both wealthy and poor consumers. The grounds for this assumption are two-fold. First, wealthy consumers' baskets are not dominated by human necessities. Changes in prices should lead to fluctuations in consumption patterns. Second, the majority of trade is intra industry exchange between wealthy nations; thus, wealthy consumers can likely find imported substitutes for skill-intensive goods.⁴

This is not to suggest that consumer baskets are not an important factor influencing mass trade preferences. To understand the consumer effects of trade, however, it is necessary to take a serious look at consumer preferences and behavior. While political scientists have generally adopted a very narrow view of consumers from economics, consumers routinely express complex interests that influence the costs and benefits of trade. Many consumers, for example, express a strong preference for a basket of domestic goods.

Buying Globalization

Consumers who treat imports as substitutes for domestically produced goods benefit from trade; an increase in imports leads to lower prices and greater variety. Many individuals, however, express a negative attitude toward imports. Disdain for foreign-made products has been identified as a key factor in determining the desirability of imports and has been described as a clear challenge to marketing (Hong and Wyer 1989; Yoo and Donthu 2005). Around the world, consumers are routinely found to reject imports in favor of domestically produced goods (Supphellen and Rittenburg 2001). Consumers in the United States, for example, report higher levels of perceived risk for imports than for identical products produced domestically even if the imported product is produced by an American firm (Hampton 1977). Many consumers possess a strong preference for domestic products and thus fail to experience the consumer

⁴ Although Baker (2005, fig. 1) reports a significant interaction between income and skill abundance and demonstrates that poor consumers in developing countries are less supportive of trade, these results do not verify that wealthy consumers in developed economies are less supportive of trade than their poor counterparts as predicted. In fact, the estimate reported for the United States and South Korea indicates that income has no influence on trade support in developed economies.

gains of trade. How will open trade affect consumers who prefer home goods and have a domestic consumer orientation?

Trade liberalization has welfare implications for heavy consumers of import-competing goods. Consumers of domestic goods can anticipate an increase in the prices and/or a reduction in the variety of domestically produced products. Trade liberalization will lead to a decrease in demand for import-competing goods as some consumers will opt for imports. Likewise, there should be a decrease in supply as some domestic producers will be forced out of the market. The effect of open markets on import-competing goods is thus conditional upon the relative change in supply and demand. Under certain conditions, trade liberalization can lead to higher domestic prices for import-competing goods or the elimination of industries producing welfare losses for consumers who prefer domestically produced import-competing products.

First, if demand for domestically produced goods does not remain relatively strong in relation to supply, inefficient industries will be eliminated reducing the availability of domestically produced goods. While this is advantageous to the general population, consumers who prefer domestic goods will experience a welfare loss if home goods are no longer available. Consider, for example, the apparel and shoe industry where U.S. producers have faced intense competition from cheaper imports. Consumers have benefited in that today the average American owns more clothes and spends a smaller percentage of income on apparel and shoes. The American textile industry, however, has contracted as a result of cheaper imports.

Second, if demand for domestically produced goods remains relatively strong in relation to supply, consumers will pay higher prices for the domestically produced product. While it may seem counterintuitive, such a situation is likely if liberalization produces a large opportunity cost for continuing production in the disadvantaged industry. Consumers of domestic products will be forced to pay higher prices as the cost of supporting the inefficient industry will be assessed only to the heavy consumers of the domestic product. Government subsidies that maintain profits for weak sectors while keeping consumer prices low present an illustration of the redistributive effects of market protection.

Consider, for example, rice markets in Japan. Japan's rice industry is heavily protected by both the domestic subsidization of farmers and the strict border control of foreign rice. First, government programs protect the income of farmers and maintain the price of rice. Although there is no direct intervention in rice prices from 1995, the Rice Farming Income Stabilization Program compensates farmers if the price of rice fails to meet a set value. Income insurance guarantees domestic rice production by compensating farmers for the opportunity cost of continuing to grow rice. Japan is reported to spend as much as \$2.8 billion a year on domestic policies to protect farmers (Fukuda, Dyck, and Stout 2003; MacLaren 2011).

On the surface, it appears that all consumers should oppose the protection of rice. Many Japanese consumers, however, strongly prefer Japanese rice to imports. So Japanese rice policy disperses the cost of maintaining the relatively inefficient industry across all citizens, which benefits heavy consumers of

domestic rice. Furthermore, government subsidization ensures that an adequate supply of domestic rice is available.

In the absence of border control and farm income protection, the overall price of rice would plummet in Japan. The supply of domestically produced rice, however, would decrease as most farms are unprofitable even at current prices. If there is a reduction in supply while demand remains strong, it follows that the price of domestic rice would increase. But in the absence of government intervention, the entire cost of supporting the inefficient industry would be shouldered by consumers of domestic rice through higher prices, not dispersed across the entire economy. Thus, the liberalization of rice markets in Japan would create gains for those who favor imports, but would lead to a welfare reduction for consumers who have a strong preference for the domestically produced product.

Third, if a reduction in supply is offset by an equivalent decrease in demand, trade liberalization will have no effect on the price and availability of import-competing goods. Under this condition, however, there is still no welfare benefit of trade for consumers who prefer domestically produced import-competing goods. It is thus expected that individuals with a domestic consumer orientation will perceive trade as less beneficial than those with a global orientation.

It is argued here that consumer interests drive individual perceptions about the personal impact of trade. Specifically, it is predicted that individuals with a disdain for imports will view trade as having a negative personal impact. Relying on attitudes to predict attitudes, however, presents a number of hurdles for empirical studies. In this case, the direction of causality presents a serious concern. While consumer orientation alters individual self-interest toward trade, consumer orientation is similarly influenced by perceptions of trade. That is to say, individuals who are opposed to trade will likely express negative attitudes toward imports. This is not a chicken and egg problem of determining which comes first but a simultaneous effect that should be recognized.

One avenue to address this endogeneity concern is to examine the impact of consumer orientation on individuals who perceive trade as neutral or beneficial. The consumer orientation theory predicts a linear effect. While a domestic orientation should be associated with negative trade attitudes, a global orientation should lead to positive trade attitudes. This perspective argues that consumer orientation will have an effect even on those individuals who have a positive or neutral view of trade eliminating the possibility that consumer attitudes are entirely driven by protectionist sentiments.

Empirical Examination of Trade Perceptions⁵

To test the impact of consumer orientation on trade perceptions, survey data from the *Fortune* “Magazine Poll on the Economy” is analyzed (Fortune 2008).

⁵ Supplemental materials and replication files are available in the Harvard Dataverse and can be accessed at <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/EHSA5Q>

The Fortune Poll is a nationally representative sample of 1,000 U.S. adults conducted by SRBI Inc. in early January 2008.⁶ The telephone poll gauges respondents' opinions about the economy and foreign policy. The United States provides an ideal location for considering the impact of consumer orientation. Because the United States has a large diverse economy, consumers have the option of purchasing a large basket of domestically produced goods.

Consumers in developing economies, for instance, may be dependent upon imports for durable and luxury goods as pointed out by Baker (2003, 2005). Similarly in many developed economies, consumers often have no choice but to buy imported food and other nondurable goods. U.S. consumers, however, have a large variety of domestically produced goods and allocate the overwhelming majority of private household expenditures to home goods. In 2010, for example, 90 percent of U.S. food expenditures went to domestic products. The United States is likewise a large producer of both durable and nondurable goods; over two-thirds of durable and a surprising three-fourths of nondurable household expenditures went to goods produced in the United States (Hale and Hobijn 2011). While U.S. tariff rates are relatively low, they remain higher than many other developed economies. Furthermore, U.S. competitiveness in a diverse set of industries ensures that even low tariffs can squeeze out imports. The United States therefore provides a case in which consumers have the opportunity to purchase a large variety of domestically produced goods and a market that could experience an increase in imports as a result of changes in exposure to trade.

First, a measure of consumer orientation is needed. Consumer orientation is measured by respondents' propensity to buy foreign products. An attitudinal measure is employed to capture consumer perceptions. A behavioral measure would capture an individual's exposure to globalization but not provide information about preferences. A consumer with a domestic orientation, for example, may be forced to buy large baskets of imports if domestic substitutes are not available or are prohibitively costly. This individual may believe trade is personally harming her consumption regardless of behavioral patterns.

Respondents are asked whether they are less likely to purchase a product if they know it is manufactured in one of nine different countries or regions. The six countries are Japan, South Korea, India, China, Mexico, and Canada. The three geographic regions are Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and Africa. While this is not a perfect measure of attitudes toward all imports, the measure assesses attitudes toward imports from a variety of countries with considerable variation in economic development, political institutions, foreign policy, and cultural similarity and thus provides a reasonable proxy of general consumer orientation.

⁶ Sample characteristics are comparable to U.S. national demographics. Descriptive statistics of the sample characteristics are presented in Table 11 in the Supplemental materials and can be accessed at <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/EHSA5Q>

An index of the nine responses is created and the variable *consumer orientation* ranges from -9 to 9 with higher scores indicating more willingness to buy foreign products. An index provides an appropriate measure for a number of reasons. First, it is necessary to distinguish between a domestic, global, and neutral orientation so a range is preferable to a dichotomous variable. Second, it is important to consider preferences across different types of countries as attitudes toward imports are affected by the goods country of origin. Third, as a result of idiosyncratic tendencies any individual may express peculiar preferences toward a particular country. The index thus provides a general measure of consumer orientation. The measure is ordinal to the extent that an individual with a positive view of all nine areas would likely receive more benefit from trade than an individual with a positive view of only eight areas.

An individual who is less likely to purchase products from all of the listed countries and regions would score a -9 and is considered to have a strong domestic orientation. An individual more likely to buy products from all the areas would score a 9 and be considered to have a strong global orientation. An individual who is, on average, indifferent about purchasing items from the listed countries and regions would score a 0 and be considered to have a neutral orientation. Figure 1 provides a breakdown of respondents' consumer orientation. There is large variation in consumer attitudes toward foreign-produced goods.

Trade perceptions are measured directly by the following question: *As you may know, international trade has increased a great deal in recent years. Do you think that the growth in international trade has made things better or made things worse for you personally? (1) Made things better. (2) Made things worse. (3) Neither.*⁷ The percentages for each category are presented in Figure 2. Similar to trade policy preferences, there is considerable variation in the perceived impact of trade.

Aside from consumer orientation, a number of additional variables that likely impact perceptions of trade are included in the analysis. Most notably, skill level is predicted to influence individuals' view of trade liberalization. Trade liberalization is predicted to have distributional impacts on labor markets. Following the Stolper-Samuelson (S-S) model, individuals possessing the scare factor in the economy will face employment risks as a result of trade. Low skilled workers in the United States, for example, face wage loss and employment uncertainty as a result of liberalization. A number of studies contend that the positive effect of a college degree on support for trade is consistent with the predictions of the S-S model (Hays, Ehrlich, and Peinhardt 2005; Mayda and

⁷ It would be ideal for respondents to receive the trade perception and consumer orientation measures in a randomized order. This would allow for an examination of the direction of the impact of the variables. Unfortunately, the measures were not randomized; all respondents receive the trade perceptions measure prior to the consumer orientation measure. The questions, however, are spaced between the front end and back end of the survey reducing the likelihood of the order causing priming effects.

Figure 1.
Consumer Orientation: U.S. Attitudes toward Imports from Nine Regions




Figure 2.
Perceptions of Trade: U.S. Perceptions about the Personal Impact of Trade



Rodrik 2005; O'Rourke and Sinnott 2001; Sanz and Martínez i Coma 2008; Scheve and Slaughter 2001).

Others, however, criticize the use of education level as a measurement of skill and show that the effect of education diminishes after controlling for confounding variables (Baker 2005; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006; Mansfield and Mutz 2009). Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006) argue that education level's effect on trade attitudes is a result of exposure to economic theory and cosmopolitan views in universities, not concerns about labor markets. To account for the effect of education the variable *college graduate* is included.

Respondents who have graduated from a university are coded 1, while noncollege graduates are indicated by 0.⁸

Capital is also commonly assumed to be an abundant factor in the United States and it is thus predicted, following the S–S model, that low-income Americans will perceive trade as less beneficial than their wealthy counterparts. On the contrary, Baker (2005) argues that low-income individuals consume larger baskets of labor-intensive goods. Following this argument, consumers of labor-intensive goods in the United States will benefit from cheap imports. To control for the effect of income, the dummy variable *low income* compares individuals with a below-average family incomes to those with average or above incomes.

It is also important to consider sociotropic attitudes. Mansfield and Mutz (2009) contend that many citizens have difficulty relating national policy debates to their daily lives. The authors argue that concerns about the national economy influence trade-policy preferences and demonstrate that once sociotropic and social attitudes are accounted for, both education and sector of employment have no meaningful effect on trade attitudes.

Sociotropic attitudes may similarly influence perceptions about the personal impact of trade. Individual self-interest is embedded into a larger social context. As argued by Fordham and Kleinberg (2012), self-interest and sociotropic concerns are not necessarily mutually exclusive. An individual living in a community that is harmed by trade may also suffer as a result and thus have a negative perception of trade. Furthermore, experimental evidence supports the claim that sociotropic attitudes toward trade influence perceptions of self-interest (Hearn 2019). To account for sociotropic concerns, a dummy variable gauging trade's effect on society is created. Individuals who believe that *the economic competition that the United States is facing from foreign countries or outsourcing of U.S. jobs* is the reason the U.S. economy is slowing down are coded as 1.

Postmaterial values such as a preference for fair trade are also argued to impact support for trade (Bechtel, Bernauer, and Meyer 2012; Ehrlich 2010a). These attitudes may be distinct from self-interest related to disdain toward imports. Fair traders may oppose trade to impose their moral beliefs about the harms of trade on others, or free traders may express opposition to liberal trade policies to protect the interests of those believed to be harmed by trade.

Postmaterial values, however, also have an impact on the consumer gains of trade. If fair traders believe it is morally wrong to purchase items produced under unethical practices, they may perceive free trade as less beneficial for their personal consumption habits. It is thus important to control for postmaterial values. A respondent's acceptance of norms to promote fair trade is measured by their support of three fair-trade policies. Respondents are asked if they favor

⁸ Data to test the predictions of the Ricardo-Viner model are not available.

allowing imports only from countries that ban child labor, allowing imports only from countries that meet certain clean air and water standards, and allowing imports only from countries that allow unions to organize their workers. The variable *fair trader* ranges from 1 to 10, with higher scores indicating stronger support for fair-trade norms.

In empirical studies, the elderly and women have consistently been found to be more protectionists. It is predicted that the elderly have less labor market mobility and less opportunity to retrain and recover lost wages as a result of unemployment. The variable *age* denotes the age of the respondent by eight categories.

Similarly, it is argued that women face higher uncertainty in the labor market and are responding to economic self-interest.⁹ A competing hypothesis, however, has suggested that a knowledge gap between men and women may be driving the difference due to women having less exposure to economic training and knowledge about trade (Burgoon and Hiscox 2004). Guisinger (2016) nevertheless challenges the knowledge gap hypothesis and demonstrates that increased knowledge about trade intensifies female support for protection. A dummy variable *female* equal to 1 if the respondent is female is added.

Party membership is a common heuristic for forming policy preferences and is found to influence trade attitudes (Hays, Ehrlich, and Peinhardt 2005; Kaltenthaler, Gelleny, and Ceccoli 2004). It is also likely that perceived effects of trade may be influenced by elite messages. To account for this, the variable *conservative* is formed. Individuals who consider themselves conservative are coded as 3, while those who self-identify as liberal are coded as 1. Individuals who consider themselves in the middle are treated as a middle category.

Finally, because unemployed individuals may blame trade for their lack of employment, the dummy variable *unemployed* indicates individuals who are currently out of work as an additional measure of labor market insecurity.

To examine variation in the trade perceptions a multinomial logit is estimated with the neutral category set as the reference group. Considering deviations from the neutral category allows for an examination of the linear predictions of consumer orientation. While it is important to note that unordered models require additional assumptions such as independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), a simpler ordinal model would limit the ability to examine the effect of consumer orientation independent of negative trade perceptions. As argued by Kleinberg and Fordham (2017, 445), “these assumptions that might not always be justified... are worth making if explicitly modeling DKNO responses leads to different inferences than does omitting them from the analysis.”

⁹ Hall, Kao, and Nelson (1998) argue that women will prefer low tariffs as a result of a preference for lower prices. This prediction, however, has not been supported by empirical studies of trade attitudes. Furthermore, women are commonly found to express higher levels of disdain toward imports than men. This finding is often attributed to differences in risk perception.

In this case, however, the IIA assumption does not appear to provide a significant concern. First, IIA is most likely to be violated in cases where alternate options are similar. The options in this case are positive, negative, and neutral which can be considered distinct choices (Kleinberg and Fordham 2017, footnote 8) Second, a Hausman-McFadden test is conducted by comparing models eliminating one option with the full model. This test reveals no evidence of a violation of IIA. The models are likewise estimated using an ordered logit treating neutral as a middle category. The ordered model produces statistically and substantively equivalent results.¹⁰

To address concerns about multicollinearity and spurious effects of control variables, three models are estimated. The first model includes only the consumer orientation measure with no controls. The second model includes the basic predictors of trade attitudes excluding attitudinal variables. The third model includes the full set of controls. The effect of consumer orientation is significant regardless of adjustments in model specification.

Results

Model 1 provides a first cut and only includes the main explanatory variable *consumer orientation* (Table 1). The likelihood of perceiving trade as beneficial or harmful is displayed in reference to the neutral group. First, the large effect of consumer orientation on perceiving trade as harmful can be seen. Individuals with a domestic consumer orientation are more likely to view trade as having a negative personal impact. A one-unit shift toward a global orientation is associated with a decrease in the likelihood of perceiving trade as harmful relative to neutral, $B = -.091$, $p = .00$. This result, however, should be taken with caution as it is likewise anticipated that those who are harmed by trade will express a negative opinion of imports. There is thus a simultaneous relationship that cannot be easily teased out.

To examine the effect of consumer orientation in the absence of this simultaneous relationship, consider the effect of consumer orientation on the likelihood of viewing trade as positive relative to neutral. Again we see a large and statistically significant coefficient in the anticipated direction. A one-unit shift toward a global orientation leads to an increase in the likelihood of perceiving trade as beneficial relative to neutral, $B = .094$, $p = .00$. This supports the linear prediction and provides evidence that consumer orientation influences perceptions of trade as there is little concern that positive trade attitudes would influence consumer orientation.

¹⁰ Detailed results of the Hausman-McFadden test and for the ordered probit estimates are presented in Table 5 and Table 9 in the Supplemental materials and can be accessed at <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/EHSA5Q>

Table 1. Perceptions of Trade—Model 1

Multinomial Logit—Reference Category = Neutral

Independent Variable	Beneficial vs. Neutral			Harmful vs. Neutral		
	B	S.E.	(p-Value)	B	S.E.	(p-Value)
Consumer orientation (domestic—global)	.094	.03	(.00)***	-.091	.03	(.00)***
Observations	845					
Pseudo-R-squared	.03					
χ^2	45.77					

Notes: Robust standard errors (S.E.).

***p < .01 (two-tailed t-test).

Table 2. Perceptions of Trade—Model 2

Multinomial Logit—Reference Category = Neutral

Independent Variable	Beneficial vs. Neutral			Harmful vs. Neutral		
	B	S.E.	(p-Value)	B	S.E.	(p-Value)
Consumer orientation (domestic—global)	.058	.03	(.07)*	-.099	.03	(.00)***
College graduate	.472	.21	(.02)**	-.203	.20	(.32)
Low income	.134	.22	(.54)	.437	.21	(.04)**
Unemployed	.189	.51	(.71)	.145	.52	(.78)
Female	-.651	.20	(.00)***	-.281	.20	(.16)
Age	-.208	.06	(.00)***	-.118	.06	(.04)**
Conservative	.148	.16	(.34)	-.057	.15	(.70)
Observations	773					
Pseudo-R-squared	.06					
χ^2	83.18					

Notes: Robust standard errors (S.E.).

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10 (two-tailed t-test).

Model 2 includes the basic controls commonly found in models predicting trade attitudes excluding the attitudinal variables (Table 2). Consumer orientation again significantly predicts trade perceptions. A move toward a global orientation is associated with an increase in the likelihood of perceiving trade as positive relative to neutral. And similarly, a shift toward a global consumer orientation leads to a decrease in perceiving trade as personally harmful.

The results, however, are mixed in regard to the predictions of the labor anxiety approach. First, consider factor endowments. Having a college

education is associated with an increased likelihood of perceiving trade as beneficial. Contrary to the predictions of the S–S model, however, low skill is not associated with perceiving trade as harmful. This suggests that the impact of education is not being driven by labor market concerns but perhaps ideas and values learned in college as the learning hypothesis predicts.

Low income, on the contrary, preforms as predicted by the S–S model and in contrast to the predictions of the consumer baskets approach. Low-income individuals who would perhaps benefit from a large basket of imported goods are more likely to view trade as harmful. Gender, however, does not conform to the labor story as women are not more likely to view trade as harmful relative to neutral. To the contrary, women are much less likely to perceive trade as beneficial. Unemployment and political ideology fail to significantly predict trade perceptions. Interestingly, age is associated with neutrality as an increase in age leads to a reduction in the likelihood of viewing trade as either positive or negative.

Model 3 includes the full list of control variables. As detailed in Table 3, the effect of consumer orientation remains significant and as predicted with the inclusion of the attitudinal variables. Similarly, the additional variables do not statistically or substantively alter the effect of education, income, age, unemployment, or political ideology previously discussed in Model 2. With

Table 3. Perceptions of Trade—Model 3

Multinomial Logit—Reference Category = Neutral

Independent Variable	Beneficial vs. Neutral			Harmful vs. Neutral		
	B	S.E.	(p-Value)	B	S.E.	(p-Value)
Consumer orientation (domestic—global)	.055	.03	(.09)*	−.102	.04	(.00)***
College graduate	.380	.22	(.08)*	−.182	.21	(.40)
Low income	.157	.23	(.49)	.423	.22	(.05)*
Unemployed	.093	.51	(.86)	−.018	.53	(.97)
Female	−.602	.22	(.01)**	−.359	.21	(.09)*
Age	−.194	.06	(.00)	−.099	.06	(.099)*
Conservative	.261	.16	(.11)	.157	.16	(.34)
Sociotropic	−.358	.21	(.095)*	.425	.22	(.05)*
Postmaterial values	.004	.05	(.94)	.147	.05	(.01)**
Observations	737					
Pseudo-R-squared	.08					
χ^2	107.57					

Notes: Robust standard errors (S.E.).
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10 (two-tailed t-test).

the inclusion of the attitudinal variables, women are found to be more likely to express a neutral opinion.

Postmaterial values have a significant effect on viewing trade as harmful as predicted. Individuals with postmaterial values will receive less benefit from trade if they discount products particularly from developing countries as a result of ethical consumption. As predicted, an increase in postmaterial values is associated with an increase in the likelihood of perceiving trade as personally harmful relative to neutral. However, postmaterial values have no impact on positive views of trade.

The sociotropic measure performs as expected. An increase in sociotropic concerns leads to a reduction in the likelihood of perceiving trade as beneficial. And an increase in sociotropic concern is associated with a large increase in viewing trade as harmful relative to neutral. The causal direction of this large effect, however, cannot be easily teased out.

The independent variable, *consumer orientation*, is an ordinal index measure. The above analysis for parsimonious reasons assumes the ordinal variable has linear effects. That is to say, any one-unit change in consumer orientation has an equivalent effect. This is an assumption often made of ordinal variables, but it is important to consider if nonlinear effects are influencing the results. First, a model is estimated treating consumer orientation as categorical. The Bayesian information criterion and Akaike information criterion are used to evaluate the two models. The model treating consumer orientation as linear outperforms the categorical model in both tests.¹¹

The consumer orientation measure asks individuals about attitudes toward nine countries and regions. There may be some concern that one particular country or region is an outlier driving the results. For example, over 60 percent of consumers express negative attitudes toward Chinese products. A second consumer orientation measure excluding China is generated. This measure now considers consumer attitudes toward eight countries and regions and ranges from -8 to 8. The results of the analysis are not statistically or substantively impacted by the inclusion or exclusion of China.¹²

The above findings only examine the statistical significance of the variables. It is important to consider the substantive effects of consumer orientation on trade attitude formation. Clarify is used to simulate 10,000 sampling distributions of the estimates based on the coefficients and standard errors in Model 3 in Table 3 (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000). The predicted probability of a hypothetical individual perceiving trade as *harmful*, *beneficial*, or *neutral* is reported in Table 4. When holding all variables at their median values, an adjustment in consumer orientation leads to substantial changes in support for trade. All else equal,

¹¹ See Table 10 in the Supplemental materials, available at <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/EHSA5Q>

¹² A detailed breakdown of import perceptions by country of origin and detailed results of models excluding China are available in the Supplemental materials and can be accessed at <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/EHSA5Q>

Table 4. Predicted Probability of Trade Perception

Predicted Probability of Trade Perception

Consumer Orientation (25th–75th percentile)

	25th Percentile	75th Percentile	Difference
Category	(−3)	(0)	[95% C.I.]
Beneficial	.196	.258	.061 [.033, .094]
Neutral	.268	.300	.031 [−.005, .069]
Harmful	.532	.438	−.093 [−.135, −.052]

Notes: Estimates are calculated using coefficients and standard errors in Model 3 in Table 3. All additional variables are set to median value.

going from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile of consumer orientation produces a .06 increase in the probability of viewing trade as beneficial. A similar change produces a .09 decrease in the probability of viewing trade as harmful. As can be seen from the 95 percent confidence intervals provided in brackets, both differences are statistically significant.

Conclusion

This article applies a consumer framework to individual perceptions of trade. It is argued that self-interest, expressed through consumption, drives trade attitudes. Specifically, heavy consumers of imports will experience welfare gains as a result of trade and thus buy into globalization. Government protection, on the contrary, subsidizes heavy consumers of domestic goods. As predicted, higher levels of disdain toward imports are shown to lead to a negative view of trade in survey data from the United States. It is important, however, to consider the limitations of this study. First, the survey data is collected in 2008 during a recession. It is possible that the economic downturn increased consumer anxiety as shoppers are likely to be particularly concerned about prices. If this is true, the positive effects of a global consumer orientation may be weaker in times of economic boom. There is little evidence, however, that this is occurring. Most notably, low-income individuals who are likely the most concerned about prices perceive trade as personally harmful. Second, it is difficult to parse out causal effects in observational research particularly when interested in attitudinal variables. Further research utilizing experimental methods to directly examine issues of causality is vital to progress the consumer orientation approach.

It is also important to think about the scope of consumer orientation theory. While consumer attitudes impact consumption in all economies, consumer orientation is likely to be most applicable when examining trade attitudes in advanced industrial economies. There are two reasons that this is the case. First, while consumers all over the world are found to differentiate goods by country of origin, products produced in wealthy countries generally have a strong reputation. Consumers in developing countries are thus less likely to prefer domestically produced import-competing goods. Second, as a result of the spread of postmaterial values, consumers in developed countries may experience fewer consumer benefits from trade liberalization if they forgo the purchase of good that are believed to be produced unethically.

While additional research is needed to tease out the precise impact of consumer orientation, future work examining trade attitude formation should carefully consider variation in consumer orientation as well as labor markets. A consumer approach can help advance research on a number of major issues in the political economy of trade such as agricultural protection and the management of public opinion.

Despite its global importance, political scientists have few explanations for the lack of public support for agricultural trade commonly found in developed countries. There is little consumer pressure to increase the liberalization of agriculture and there is often organized consumer opposition to protect the domestic production of prominent foods. From a consumer preference framework, consumer opposition to agricultural trade should be more likely if liberalization will lead to an increase in the price of domestically produced goods. It is thus expected that consumers will be more likely to oppose food imports in countries that rely on farm income stabilization programs that disperse the cost of inefficient industries across society. Similarly, consumer opposition is predicted in countries with extremely noncompetitive agricultural sectors that are vulnerable to elimination.

Consumer interests also have implications for the management of trade policy preferences. The embedded liberalism thesis contends that governments should link liberal trade policies with welfare programs to protect against the distributional consequences of liberalization that erode public support for trade (Ruggie 1982). Another approach that governments could take to ensure support for open trade policies is to increase consumer confidence in imports. While welfare programs to protect vulnerable members of society provide a successful mechanism for increasing support for trade among likely trade losers, such targeted programs are not without political repercussions. Individuals who are likely to gain from trade have been found to oppose trade-related compensation programs (Ehrlich 2010b; Ehrlich and Hearn 2014). While labor market protection targets only some members of society, consumer protection provides a public good of which everyone benefits. Research examining the interaction between consumer protection and public support for trade would

provide new insights into the ability and consequences of government programs to manage trade attitudes.

This article applies a consumer framework to individual perceptions of trade. It is argued that self-interest, expressed through consumption, drives trade attitudes. Specifically, heavy consumers of imports will experience welfare gains as a result of trade and thus buy into globalization. Government protection, on the contrary, subsidizes heavy consumers of domestic goods. Consumer preferences, however, are understudied in the political economy of trade literature. Future work examining trade attitude formation should carefully consider variation in consumer orientation as well as labor markets and sociotropic attitudes.

About the Authors

Eddie Hearn is an Assistant Professor in the Faculty of Global Communications at Doshisha University in Kyoto, Japan. He received a PhD in Political Science from the Florida State University. His research focuses on international political economy, foreign policy, and the use of experimental methods. His recent work examining foreign policy preference formation in Japan has been published in *Research and Politics* and *The Japanese Journal of Political Science*.

References

- BAKER, ANDY. 2003. "Why is Trade Reform so Popular in Latin America." *World Politics* 55 (3): 423-455. Accessed on September 2, 2019. Available online at <https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2003.0014>
- . 2005. "Who Wants to Globalize? Consumer Tastes and Labor Markets in a Theory of Trade Policy Beliefs." *American Journal of Political Science* 49 (4): 924-938. Accessed on September 2, 2019. Available online at <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3647706>
- BECHTEL, MICHAEL M., THOMAS BERNAUER, AND RETO MEYER. 2012. "The Green Side of Protectionism: Environmental Concerns and Three Facets of Trade Policy Preferences." *Review of International Political Economy* 19 (5): 837-866. Accessed on September 2, 2019. Available online at <https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2011.611054>
- BURGOON, BRIAN, AND MICHAEL J. HISCOX. 2004. *The Mysterious Case of Female Protectionism: Gender Bias in Attitudes toward International Trade*. Unpublished Manuscript. Accessed on September 2, 2019. Available online at https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Brian_Burgoon/publication/228611421_The_Myste

rious_Case_of_Female_Protectionism_Gender_Bias_in_Attitudes_Toward_International_Trade/links/0deec51dfedd1d29f7000000.pdf

EHRlich, SEAN D. 2010a. "The Fair Trade Challenge to Embedded Liberalism." *International Studies Quarterly* 54 (4): 1013-1033. Accessed on September 2, 2019. Available online at <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40931152>

———. 2010b. "Who Supports Compensation? Individual Preferences for Trade-Related Unemployment Insurance." *Business and Politics* 12 (1): 1-22. Accessed on September 2, 2019. Available online at <https://doi.org/10.2202/1469-3569.1289>

EHRlich, SEAN D., AND EDDIE HEARN. 2014. "Does Compensating the Losers Increase Support for Trade? An Experimental Test of the Embedded Liberalism Thesis." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 10 (2): 149-164. Accessed on September 2, 2019. Available online at <https://doi.org/10.1111/fpa.12001>

FORDHAM, BENJAMIN O., AND KATJA B. KLEINBERG. 2012. "How Can Economic Interests Influence Support for Free Trade?" *International Organization* 66 (2): 311-328. Accessed on September 2, 2019. Available online at <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41428957>

FORTUNE. 2008. *Fortune Magazine Poll on the Economy*. Abt SRBI, Inc. [producer], The Roper Center, University of Connecticut [distributor].

FUKUDA, HISAO, JOHN H. DYCK, AND JIM STOUT. 2003. *Rice Sector Policies in Japan*. US Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. Accessed on September 2, 2019. Available online at <https://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/pub-details/?pubxml:id=38486>

GUISINGER, ALEXANDRA. 2016. "Information, Gender, and Differences in Individual Preferences for Trade." *Journal of Women, Politics & Policy* 37 (4): 538-561. Accessed on September 2, 2019. Available online at <https://doi.org/10.1080/1554477X.2016.1192428>

HAINMUELLER, JENS, AND MICHAEL J. HISCOX. 2006. "Learning to Love Globalization: Education and Individual Attitudes toward International Trade." *International Organization* 60 (2): 469-498. Accessed on September 2, 2019. Available online at <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818306060140>

HALE, GALINA, AND BART HOBIJN. 2011. "The US Content of 'Made in China.'" *FRBSF Economic Letter* 25. Accessed on September 2, 2019. Available online at <https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economic-letter/2011/august/us-made-inchina/>

HALL, H. KEITH, CHIHWA KAO, AND DOUGLAS NELSON. 1998. "Women and Tariffs: Testing the Gender Gap Hypothesis in a Downs-Mayer Political-Economy Model." *Economic Inquiry* 36 (2): 320-332. Accessed on September 2, 2019. Available online at <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1998.tb01717.x>

HAMPTON, GERALD M. 1977. "Perceived Risk in Buying Products Made Abroad by American Firms." *Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science (Pre-1986)* 5: 45-48. Accessed on September 2, 2019. Available online at <https://doi.org/10.1177/009207037700500113>

HAYS, JUDE C., SEAN D. EHRLICH, AND CLINT PEINHARDT. 2005. "Government Spending and Public Support for Trade in the OECD: An Empirical Test of the Embedded Liberalism Thesis." *International Organization* 59 (2): 473-494. Accessed on September 2, 2019. Available online at <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3877913>

HEARN, EDDIE. 2019. "Disentangling the Relationship between Socio- and Ego-Tropic Trade Attitudes: A Survey Experiment in Japan." *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 1-12. Accessed on December 2, 2019. Available online at <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1468109919000124>

HELPMAN, ELHANAN. 1981. "International Trade in the Presence of Product Differentiation, Economies of Scale and Monopolistic Competition: A Chamberlin-Heckscher-Ohlin Approach." *Journal of International Economics* 11 (3): 305-340. Accessed on September 2, 2019. Available online at [https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-1996\(81\)90001-5](https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-1996(81)90001-5)

HISCOX, MICHAEL J. 2006. "Through a Glass and Darkly: Attitudes toward International Trade and the Curious Effects of Issue Framing." *International Organization* 60 (3): 755-780. Accessed on September 2, 2019. Available online at <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818306060255>

HONG, SUNG-TAI, AND ROBERT S. WYER, JR. 1989. "Effects of Country-of-Origin and Product-Attribute Information on Product Evaluation: An Information Processing Perspective." *Journal of Consumer Research* 16 (2): 175-187. Accessed on September 2, 2019. Available online at <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2489316>

KALTENTHALER, KARL C., RONALD D. GELLENY, AND STEPHEN J. CECCOLI. 2004. "Explaining Citizen Support for Trade Liberalization." *International Studies Quarterly* 48 (4): 829-851. Accessed on September 2, 2019. Available online at <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3693537>

KING, GARY, MICHAEL TOMZ, AND JASON WITTENBERG. 2000. "Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation." *American Journal of Political Science* 44 (2): 347-361. Accessed on September 2, 2019. Available online at <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2669316>

KLEINBERG, KATJA B., AND BENJAMIN O. FORDHAM. 2017. "Don't Know Much about Foreign Policy: Assessing the Impact of 'Don't Know' and 'No Opinion' Responses on Inferences about Foreign Policy Attitudes." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 14 (3): 429-448. Accessed on September 2, 2019. Available online at <https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orw060>

KRUGMAN, PAUL R. 1981. "Intraindustry Specialization and the Gains from Trade." *The Journal of Political Economy* 89 (5): 959-973. Accessed on September 2, 2019. Available online at <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1830815>

MACLAREN, DONALD. 2011. "Imperfect Competition, State Trading and Japan's Imports of Rice." *ISER Discussion Paper No. 806*. Accessed on September 2, 2019. Available online at <https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2011/DP0806.pdf>

MANSFIELD, EDWARD D., AND DIANA C. MUTZ. 2009. "Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety." *International Organization* 63 (3): 425-457. Accessed on September 2, 2019. Available online at <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818309090158>

MAYDA, ANNA MARIA, AND DANI RODRIK. 2005. "Why are Some People (and Countries) More Protectionist than Others?" *European Economic Review* 49 (6): 1393-1430. Accessed on September 2, 2019. Available online at <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.01.002>

NAOI, MEGUMI, AND IKUO KUME. 2011. "Explaining Mass Support for Agricultural Protectionism: Evidence from a Survey Experiment during the Global Recession." *International Organization* 65 (4): 771-795. Accessed on September 2, 2019. Available online at <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818311000221>

———. 2015. "Workers or Consumers? A Survey Experiment on the Duality of Citizens' Interests in the Politics of Trade." *Comparative Political Studies* 48 (10): 1293-1317. Accessed on September 2, 2019. Available online at <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414015574879>

O'ROURKE, KEVIN H., AND RICHARD SINNOTT. 2001. "The Determinants of Individual Trade Policy Preferences: International Survey Evidence." *Brookings Trade Forum* 157-206. Accessed on September 2, 2019. Available online at <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25063160>

RUGGIE, JOHN GERARD. 1982. "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order." *International Organization* 36 (2): 379-415. Accessed on September 2, 2019. Available online at <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706527>

SANZ, ISMAEL, AND FERRAN MARTÍNEZI COMA. 2008. "Skill and Support to Globalization in the EU." *Applied Economics Letters* 15 (4): 271-275. Accessed on September 2, 2019. Available online at <https://doi.org/10.1080/13504850600592416>

SCHEVE, KENNETH F., AND MATTHEW J. SLAUGHTER. 2001. "What Determines Individual Trade-Policy Preferences?" *Journal of International Economics* 54 (2): 267-292. Accessed on September 2, 2019. Available online at [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-1996\(00\)00094-5](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-1996(00)00094-5)

SUPPHELLEN, MAGNE, AND TERRI L. RITTENBURG. 2001. "Consumer Ethnocentrism When Foreign Products are Better." *Psychology & Marketing* 18 (9): 907-927. Accessed on September 2, 2019. Available online at <https://doi.org/10.1002/mar.1035>

YOO, BOONGHEE, AND NAVEEN DONTU. 2005. "The Effect of Personal Cultural Orientation on Consumer Ethnocentrism: Evaluations and Behaviors of US Consumers toward Japanese Products." *Journal of International Consumer Marketing* 18 (1-2): 7-44. Accessed on September 2, 2019. Available online at https://doi.org/10.1300/J046v18n01_02